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Public and Private
as Viewed through
the Work of the
Muhtasib
ROY MOTTAHEDEH AND
KRISTEN STILT

T

muhtasib (also called ‘amil al-suq and sahib al-suq) was the
inspector of public places and behavior in towns in the premodern Middle East and North Africa (and in some communities of
Muslims elsewhere).* While the term muhtasib is usually translated
as “market inspector,” this official’s actual charge was much
broader. Based on the injunction “to command the right and forbid the wrong,” the history of which injunction is told with breathtaking scholarship by Michael Cook (2000), the muhtasib would
patrol public spaces and enforce “laws” wherever he saw a violation. The muhtasib therefore gave Islamic law an immediate presence in public space and was an important face of the law in
society. The commercial aspects of the muhtasib were useful
enough that this position continued to exist under non-Muslim
rule, as it did in Spain.
Several types of writings are relevant to studying the work of
the muhtasib, including theoretical writings on the role, function, and tasks of the muhtasib, and practical manuals to guide
the muhtasib in his work in a particular place and time.1 In this
essay we use a passage from a work of the first type, a treatise on
ethics and law by the great theologian and jurist, Ghazali (d.
1111 A.D.),2 and passages from the practical manual for the
muhtasib ascribed to Ibn al-Ukhuwah (d. 1329 A.D.)3 to illustrate
the divisions between public and private as they appear in the
HE
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work of the muhtasib. These divisions show that the line between
public and private was not rigidly fixed but, rather, shifted
according to the relations among the people involved in any
particular situation. An impermissible intrusion by one person
into the private space of another may be permissible if taken by
yet another person. Furthermore, what is considered outside
the jurisdiction of the muhtasib because it is one person’s private
space may not be considered private in relation to another official, such as the police (shurta) or judge.4 Taking this point yet
further, this essay shows that relational standing seems the most
important key to understanding public and private in Islamic
legal thinking.5

The Muhtasib and Public and Private Divisions in Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din
Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din (The Revivification of the Religious Sciences) is
considered the most significant work of Abu Hamid Muhammad
b. Muhammad al-Tusi, al-Ghazali, in terms of both its size and substance. Ghazali intended this text to be a guide for Muslims to all
important aspects of religious life, emphasizing that the purpose
of religious knowledge and obedience is eternal salvation (Encyclopedia of Islam, 1954: “al-Ghazali”). Ghazali meant his book to be
a bridge between ethics and law.
In the second of the book’s four parts, which covers ‘adat
(social customs), Ghazali devoted a lengthy chapter to the order
to “command the right and forbid the wrong.” The interesting
part of this chapter for our purposes is the definition of the scope
of behavior to which this order applies.6 Ghazali stated that the
muhtasib’s concern is each wrong that is presently existing, manifest to the muhtasib without spying (tajassus),7 and whose wrongness is known without independent legal reasoning (ijtihad)8
(Ghazali, 1996: 437).
According to Ghazali, “wrong” (munkar, literally “forbidden” or
“to be forbidden”) includes but is larger than the category of “sin-
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ful.” If the muhtasib sees two insane people having sex he should
stop them although neither is legally responsible. We might infer
that this is in part because the public is a realm of propriety, and
in which the muhtasib should discourage the inclination to do
wrong. (It might also be argued that the act should be stopped
because illegitimate children may result, but Ghazali gives the further instance of a mad man having sex with a large animal.) But
Ghazali explicitly says it is not stopped because of the “loathsomeness” (tafahush) of the “picture of the act” and its being “in
front of people”; if the muhtasib came across the act taking place
outside of the public view (fi khalwatin) he would still have to stop
the insane person or persons involved because what they were
engaging in is wrong (Ghazali, 1996: 437).
According to Ghazali, the muhtasib’s jurisdiction covers both
major and minor sins. Exposing one’s pudendum (‘awra) in the
bathhouse is a minor sin but one the muhtasib should work to stop
(Ghazali, 1996: 437).9 This reference to the pudendum points to
an ongoing concern in which privacy of the body is considered
differently according to who is present. Being totally alone allows
nudity. In the bathhouse, men (and women, in the case of the
women’s bathhouse) should cover their pudenda, usually with a
towel around the waist. In the street, however, a mere towel would
be impermissible dress. The bathhouse was sufficiently private to
allow most of the body to be exposed, but sufficiently public as to
require covering of the pudendum.
The muhtasib may only address a wrong that is manifest
(zahir); the muhtasib is not permitted to try to gain information
about a sin that a person conceals in his home behind a closed
door. The classic story told to define the muhtasib’s exclusion
from the home is about the second caliph, ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al‘Aziz, who scaled the walls of a house, saw the owner in a reprehensible state and, acting in the capacity of a muhtasib, reproved
him. The owner replied, “O Commander of the Faithful, if I
have sinned once, you have sinned three times.” “How so?”
asked ‘Umar. The owner replied: “The Qur’an says: ‘Do not spy’
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and you have done so. The Qur’an says: ‘Come into houses
through their doors,’ and you have entered over the roof. And
the Qur’an says: ‘Do not enter the houses of others until you
have made yourselves known and greeted the inhabitants,’ and
you have not greeted me.” Totally out-lawyered, ‘Umar retreated
(Ghazali, 1996: 437).
However, Ghazali, who tells this anecdote, as does practically
every other manual on the muhtasib, says that there is an exception: when things are known from outside the house such as the
sound of wind and string instruments, the muhtasib may enter
and break up the instruments; action may also be taken if the
loud sounds of drunkards are heard (Ghazali, 1996: 438). In
these cases, what is visible it not the act of playing instruments or
drinking intoxicants, but rather sounds so closely linked with
these activities that they are tantamount to the activities themselves. It is as if the offending host’s door were wide open, and
the muhtasib could see the actions from the street. A man’s home
is still his castle so long as he keeps his sins quiet and hidden
behind closed doors.
But what if the noise is not really evidence of a sin? Perhaps it
was made by mischievous minors pretending to be drunkards.
And what if the muhtasib enters the home, mistaking the source
of a musical entertainment and believing himself to be acting
properly, and then by chance finds the owner having a quiet
drinking party with a few friends? In the latter case, the muhtasib must stop them and punish them. There does not seem to be
a rule that bars the use of evidence obtained wrongly although
in good faith. This example is in contrast to the case of ‘Umar,
who did not pursue charges against the man whose house he
had entered improperly.
Ghazali also makes clear that a person carries his privacy with
him, and the muhtasib can judge only on prima facie appearance.
Perhaps someone has a flagon of wine in his sleeve or under his
cloak, and circumstances tell the muhtasib that it is there (for
example, the man is a heavy drinker who has just visited the area
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of wine shops in a Christian district). As long as there is no “particular sign” of its presence (‘alama khassa), he cannot be
searched; circumstantial evidence is not sufficient. But if the outline of the flagon or lute become visible, then he should be
searched (Ghazali, 1996: 438).

Public and Private Divisions in the
Muhtasib Manual Ma‘alim al-Qurba fi Ahkam al-Hisba
The manual Ma‘alim al-Qurba fi Ahkam al-Hisba is attributed to
Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Qurashi al-Shaf‘i, known
as Ibn al-Ukhuwah. It is the best known muhtasib manual of the
Egyptian Mamluk period and since it was edited and partially
translated by Reuben Levy in 1938, it has been widely cited by
scholars.10 Little is known about the identity of the author, however, except that he died in 1329 and appears to have been an
Egyptian.
In this manual the general rules of the public-private distinction as discussed by Ghazali appear in a more detailed and pragmatic form. This is not surprising, since manuals written to guide
muhtasibs, such as Ma‘alim al-Qurba, are a distinct genre of literature, and offer us a perspective different from that of theoretical
works like Ihya’ ‘Ulum al-Din or from that of historical works that
purport to record actual events. The manuals can best be
described as something like regulations—in general they present
legal rules in a way meant to be accessible to and used by a legal
official, the muhtasib, who, while perhaps learned, probably did
not have the same level of legal education as a judge or a jurist
such as Ghazali. And, although many of the provisions reflect an
intimate knowledge of prevailing social conditions or market
practices of the authors’ particular places and times, such as
Mamluk Cairo in the case of Ma‘alim al-Qurba, the goal of the
authors is to advise how law treats these practices rather than
merely to document them.
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Ma‘alim al-Qurba is comprised of 70 chapters and covers the full
range of matters within the jurisdiction of the muhtasib. A large
part of the manual details the rules to be followed by merchants of
food, drink, and medicines, and the muhtasib is told how to detect
adulteration in these products. Ibn al-Ukhuwah instructed the
muhtasib how to detect fraud in weights and measures used by merchants, as well as in coins. He detailed rules to be followed by merchants of goods such as cloth and shoes, and outlined permissible
and impermissible terms of contracts. Services are also regulated,
such as barbers, phlebotomists, and teachers. And the muhtasib is
told how to regulate behavior in public places such as the bathhouse and mosque. The private-public distinction is best seen in
this manual in the provisions dealing with the home, the person,
the marketplace, and the mosque.
The Sanctity of the Home
Ibn al-Ukhuwah followed the same general rule as Ghazali, stating that the wrongs within the muhtasib’s jurisdiction are those
that are manifest (zahir) and that the muhtasib is not permitted to
investigate a wrong being committed at home behind closed
doors. Ibn al-Ukhuwah added an important exception to this
rule, however: when the situation involves an imminent crime the
damage of which will not be remediable, the muhtasib may spy in
order to investigate. The example given of such a situation is
when someone the muhtasib believes to be reliable informs him
that a man has retreated into seclusion with another man in order
to kill him, or is alone with a woman in order to commit fornication (Ibn al-Ukhuwah, 1976: 91).11 Perhaps Ibn al-Ukhuwah’s
exception, which is not found in Ghazali’s text, can be explained
by the nature of his manual as a practical guide, and since this
exception had a legal basis, he wanted to make it available to the
muhtasib.12
While there may be occasions in which the muhtasib is
allowed to spy upon, or enter, private homes, there is a clear
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rule as to how neighbors should treat one another. Ibn alUkhuwah provided that no one is permitted to peer into his
neighbor’s house from the roofs or windows (Ibn al-Ukhuwah,
1976: 136). There is no exception here for wrongs in progress
or on the verge of being committed; a private individual has no
right to breach the privacy of another. The muhtasib, as an
appointed official, would be expected to have a certain level of
education and skill and be knowledgeable of the rules contained in a manual such as Ibn al-Ukhuwah’s. The muhtasib is
therefore permitted a certain degree of discretion in intruding
upon private space, whereas to permit this to all individuals
would destroy the sanctity of the home.
House or home emerges as the most properly private space,
whereas the marketplace, which is discussed later in this essay, is
the most properly public. Yet these spaces are differentiated further still by who is present. The term harim refers to “those parts
of a house to which access is forbidden, and hence more particularly to the women’s quarters” (Encyclopedia of Islam, 1954:
“harim”). The sense of a woman’s privacy is stronger here than in
other parts of the house. In terms of relationships, a woman in
the company of her mahram—meaning those in a degree of consanguinity precluding marriage—allows ordinary dress; being
outside the mahram with men (in traditional circles) requires the
veil. But this hierarchy should be read in another way as well,
since hurma, the key word here, derived from the root haram,
implies both the sacrosanct and the forbidden.
Sanctity of Personal Possession
Ibn al-Ukhuwah followed and elaborated on Ghazali’s rules. If
a Muslim openly displays or makes manifest the possession of
wine, then the wine should be poured out and the Muslim punished. If the possessor is a dhimmi, then he should be punished
for displaying it, but there is disagreement as to whether it also
should be poured out, since wine is permissible for a non-Mus-
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lim (Ibn al-Ukhuwah, 1976: 84). These provisions indicate that,
for the Muslim, consuming wine at home is considered wrong,
but so long as it is done secretly and quietly the muhtasib does
not have jurisdiction over the wrong. For the non-Muslim, possession and consumption of wine is permissible and not within
the muhtasib’s jurisdiction simply because it is not wrong. Open
public display of wine drinking, however, is considered a wrong
and is within the muhtasib’s jurisdiction, both procedurally and
substantively.
The Public Space of Streets and Markets
The public thoroughfares of the market (suq) are de facto
public property, and as such they are accessible to all and no
one may appropriate them for personal use. According to Ibn
al-Ukhuwah, no merchant may sit in the narrow streets of the
market or extend shop benches into passageways beyond the
line of pillars supporting the roof of the market since this is
bothersome to pedestrians. Tethering of animals in the streets
of the market is forbidden except as required for alighting and
mounting. Throwing refuse into the middle of the streets, scattering melon rinds, and spraying water in the street is all forbidden because it may lead to someone slipping or falling (Ibn
al-Ukhuwah, 1976: 135).
However, at times public streets may take on some characteristics of private space. When women enter the marketplace, for
example, they are treated as though they carry some of the privacy of the home with them (above and beyond the general
sense of individual privacy that a person carries with him or herself as discussed earlier in the context of wine and musical
instruments). Women may also have a corresponding expectation of a certain degree of privacy, even as they enter the public
domain.
This idea is seen in Ibn al-Ukhuwah’s instruction to the muhtasib to inspect areas in which women gather, such as the yarn
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and flax markets, the banks of the river, and the door of the
women’s bathhouse (82). If the muhtasib sees a young man talking to a woman outside the context of a commercial transaction,
or even just gazing at a woman, then the muhtasib should punish
him and forbid him from standing in that place (82-83). Men
would separately be permitted to walk through the market and
linger in front of a particular shop, but they cannot do so when
it involves infringing on areas in which women are gathered,
and specifically on the personal private space a woman seems to
carry with her.
The related issue is the permissibility of women entering a predominantly male public area. At this point the woman is farthest
from the sanctity of the harim or the company of the mahram.
Does the sense of privacy that a woman carries allow her to enter
a busy street in the marketplace, with the burden on the men to
respect that privacy? Ibn al-Ukhuwah placed some of the burden
on the women. The chapter of the manual dealing with cotton
carders instructs them (and the assumption here is that the
carders are men) not to let women sit in the doorways of their
shops while waiting for the completion of the carding, nor should
the cotton carders speak with these women (225). Likewise, flax
spinners should not let women sit in the doors of their shops without a need to do so (226).
One last example from Ibn al-Ukhuwah illustrates a dilemma
faced by the muhtasib as he encountered customary practice that
conflicted with Islamic law. Astrology is strictly forbidden according to many Muslim jurists and Ibn al-Ukhuwah says so (275). Yet,
his actual instructions are to require the astrologers (as well as the
public letter writers—and the professions seem to overlap) to sit
in the middle of the highway and not in smaller streets and back
alleys. This is because the majority of their customers are women,
and men would often gather around them as well simply for the
chance to be in female company. The center of the highway was
the most public of all places and so it was easier in this setting to
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impose some control on these trades, and the behavior they
attracted. This regulation implicitly recognizes that as a practical
matter, astrology was too popular and deeply rooted to be completely forbidden (275-276).
The Mosque as Public and Private Space
The mosque is a complex arrangement of types of public and
private spaces. At times it is the place where all Muslims are
called for prayer, but access is not unrestricted. There is also a
sense that propriety before God is more urgently felt in sacralized space.
The muhtasib is charged with supervising all mosques and
ordering their attendants to keep them clean and in good condition. As part of this supervision, Ibn al-Ukhuwah instructed
the muhtasib to order the mosque attendants to close the doors
of the mosques after prayer time. Furthermore, the mosques in
general should be protected from boys, the insane, and anyone
who eats, sleeps, performs his craft, or sells goods in the
mosque. Likewise, searching for stray animals in the mosque or
sitting and talking about worldly affairs in it is forbidden (Ibn alUkhuwah, 1976: 263).13
The mosque encompasses many types of spaces. The prayer area
is divided among the legally mandated yet moveable space for
women in prayer, the area for the hermaphrodite, standing
between women and men in prayer, and the area for men. The
space between an individual saying his prayers alone, or the prayer
leader, and his or her designated barrier or hajiz is private in the
sense that if someone should pass between the worshipper and his
or her barrier, the prayer is nullified. (Many believers feel this
space in front of them to be highly “private.”) Interestingly, one
usually makes a “retreat” (i‘tikaf), a pious and personal act of devotion, in the Muslim public space of the mosque. Hence, we have
moveable self-constructed private devotional space.
The “enclosure” or maqsura made in mosques for caliphs (and
subsequently other rulers) after the murder of ‘Ali b. Abi Talib in
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661 was a scandal to many Muslims. Why should the caliph have
permanently designated private space in a mosque (which was
“public” for all Muslims)?14 Furthermore, in an anecdote from
Ghazali, the Caliph al-Mahdi had the courtyard of the Kaabah in
Mecca cleared so he could circumambulate alone. ‘Abd Allah b.
Marzuq, an officer of the caliph’s army, challenges him to claim
any greater right than any other Muslim to this part of the pilgrimage (Ghazali, 1996: 426). One might say that the caliph had
privatized what was public Muslim space.
The muhtasib should also exhort the people living in a mosque’s
neighborhood to be diligent in attending Friday prayers at the
mosque (Ibn al-Ukhuwah, 1976: 263). Beyond this, at the time of
the call to Friday prayer, he should watch for the people in the
market, who might be tempted to pursue their trades rather than
pray. (265). Ibn al-Ukhuwah did not instruct the muhtasib to enter
into private areas to bring people to the mosque for prayer. As an
interesting point of comparison from the western Muslim lands,
the author Ahmad b. ‘Abd Allah b. ‘Abd al-Ra’uf, in his medieval
Risala fi Adab al-Hisba wa al-Muhtasib, instructed the muhtasib to
check the bathhouses and caravanserais at the time of Friday
prayers to make sure people were not lingering inside but were in
the mosques, praying.15
The notions of public and private as reflected in the muhtasib’s task vividly illustrate that relational standing is perhaps the
most important key to understanding public and private in
Islamic legal thinking. The differentiation of space reflects the
“relational status” of different members of society. A public
street takes on some private attributes when women are gathered in front of a particular shop. And the muhtasib may enter
the most private space of the home, according to Ibn alUkhuwah, when it is necessary to prevent an imminent crime,
the wrong of which cannot be later undone. For all that they
are relational, a sense of the private and public, and degrees of
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definition within those terms, is clearly attested in literature on
the muhtasib.
More generally, in a sense all mundane space is equal and
only relationally attains status as private or public. This relational status even applies to the “sanctuaries” (haram) of Mecca,
Medina, and Jerusalem, in which there are special rules that further delineate this space. The relational status of these places is
“eternal” only because the divine person has chosen to define
them as such.
Notes
*Yaron

Klein, a current Harvard graduate student, took part in a seminar on the muhtasib held two years ago by Professor Mottahedeh. At that
seminar he presented a paper that raised some similar issues and
reflected points of view to be found in the present essay, which, however,
was written without conscious knowledge of Klein's excellent work. His
essay will be published in a forthcoming issue of the Harvard Middle East
and Islamic Review.
1For a general overview of these two types of writings, see “hisba” in
the Encyclopedia of Islam (1954-).
2For all his prominence, Ghazali is, of course, one of many jurists to
deal with this topic from a theoretical perspective. Another in this category is al-Mawardi’s classic work of public law, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniya.
Chapter 20, entitled “ahkam al-hisba,” covers the concept of hisba and the
specific role of the muhtasib.
3Likewise, there are a substantial number of muhtasib manuals, many
of which are published. For a thorough list, see Dien (1997: 28-31).
4If a defendant hides in his house and refuses to appear in court, the
judge may be allowed to dispatch a team to enter the defendant’s house
without permission to search for him. See Ziadeh (1996: 310-11).
5Since this essay is an attempt to raise legally interesting issues that—
to our knowledge—have not been studied extensively, we have not tried
to deal with any of them exhaustively. It could be argued that relational
standing remains one of the most important criteria of the “public” and
“private” realm.
6Cook thoroughly discusses this chapter (2000: 427-468).
7The term tajassus has the meaning of investigation but with an element of prying or spying. For brevity, we translate it herein as “spying.”
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8By use of the term muhtasib, Ghazali is not referring only to an official appointed to carry out the injunction to command the right and forbid the wrong but rather any Muslim who takes action in this regard.
9A muhtasib did in fact become involved in this issue. Diya’ al-Din was
appointed muhtasib of Cairo in 1336 and subsequently ordered the bath
attendants to use long and loose-fitting towels in the bathhouses; see alMaqrizi (vol. 2, part 2: 415).
10An edition was published in Cairo in 1976. References herein are to
this edition.
11There are, of course, rules governing accusations of wrongful acts.
The slanderous accusation of fornication (qadhf) is a hadd crime. False
accusations in general may also be punishable on a discretionary basis
(ta’zir). See Encyclopedia of Islam (1954: “kadhf”).
12For example, al-Mawardi’s treatise (which Ibn al-Ukhuwah drew
upon heavily at several points in his manual) includes this exception.
See al-Mawardi (1985: 314).
13In the extensive Encyclopedia of Islam article “masdjid,” J. Pedersen
discussed the development of restrictions on activities and behavior in
the mosque. He noted that the increase in sanctity over time “had as a
natural result that one could no longer enter a mosque at random as
had been the case in the time of the Prophet.”
14For a discussion of the history of the maqsura, see J. Pedersen, Encyclopedia of Islam (1954: “masdjid”).
15See Lévi-Provençal (1955: 76). The editor was not able to identify
Ahmad b. ‘Abd al-Ra’uf more specifically than as an Andalusian
medieval author.
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